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The Transposition and Enforcement of the 
Services Directive: A Challenge for the 
European and the National Legal Orders
Henri de Waele*
In the European Union, after a long and arduous struggle, agreement was reached on the adoption of the 
so-called Services Directive in 2006. This Directive aims to create a level playing fi eld for services and 
to remove all remaining regulatory and administrative obstacles for service transactions in and between 
Member States. The present short contribution focuses not on the substantive aspects of the Directive but 
rather highlights its institutional and constitutional impact. Attention is drawn to the great challenge 
 facing the European and national legal orders when it comes to the successful transposition and effective 
enforcement of its provisions. In order to rise to this challenge and meet the objective of a fully liberalized 
services market in Europe, a radical alteration in ECJ caselaw appears all but inevitable.
1.  Introduction: The Growing Importance of Rules on Services
The EU Rules on the free movement of services, service providers, and service recipi-
ents have been massively gaining in importance over the course of the past decade. An 
identical statement can in fact be made with regard to the global rules on cross-border 
services that have emerged in the wake of the GATT’s Uruguay Round (1986–1993).1 
In Europe alone nowadays, services are estimated to constitute no less than 70% of all 
economic transactions.2 Many of these, for example, in education, healthcare, media, and 
communication, are considered vital for the good functioning of modern-day society. 
It was therefore not surprising that the EU’s Lisbon Strategy placed much emphasis on 
furthering and streamlining this particular domain.3 Rumours regarding a premature 
* LLM, PhD, Lecturer in EU Law, Radboud University Nijmegen (The Netherlands). I am indebted to Prof. Johan 
van de Gronden for having inspired this particular contribution and to Prof. Harry Janssen for his valuable comments on 
an earlier draft. The usual disclaimer applies.
1 Which culminated in the signing and conclusion of the so-called ‘General Agreement on Services’ or GATS in 
1995.
2 See the Report of the High Level Group chaired by Wim Kok, Facing the Challenge. The Lisbon Strategy for Growth 
and Employment (Luxembourg: Offi ce for Offi cial Publications of the European Communities, 2004), 24.
3 The Lisbon Strategy (also known as the Lisbon Agenda or Lisbon Process) was set out by the European Council in 
Mar. 2000. Its aim is to make the EU the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world, capable 
of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion, and respect for the environment 
by 2010. After initially moderate results, the Lisbon Strategy was simplifi ed and relaunched in 2005; see Working together for 
growth and jobs. A new start for the Lisbon strategy, Communication from Commission President Barroso, COM (2005) 24 fi nal.
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death of said Strategy have however not been greatly exaggerated: currently, the EU 
is one year removed from the target of 2010 for making Europe the most competitive 
 knowledge-based economy worldwide, and so far, results are off-key in almost every 
respect.4 Of course, this is partly due to the systemic failure of the global economy since 
2006, triggered by the ‘credit crunch’ and the international fi nancial crisis. Little blame 
in any case may be placed on the European Commission, which has ab initio been 
encouraging innovative rules and practises, clearing the path for a steadfast growth in 
service transactions. The celebrated (infamous to some) Services Directive bears particu-
lar testimony to that: the early ‘Bolkestein draft’ certainly displayed no lack of ambition, 
and was only involuntarily stripped of its more audacious provisions (most importantly 
its ‘country of origin-principle’5) when civil society, trade unions, and the public-at-large 
took to the streets, in Brussels and beyond, and chose to put up a fi ght.6 A slimmed-
down but still far-reaching design was agreed by the end of 2006, aiming to create a 
genuine internal market in services by removing any remaining regulatory and admin-
istrative barriers. The EU Member States need to have implemented it in their national 
legal systems by the end of this year.7 For all the political turmoil and controversies that 
have been overcome so far, for lawyers and judges, the real challenges may however still 
be ahead. The following paragraphs outline and discuss some salient legal complexities 
concerning the transposal and enforcement of the 2006 Services Directive (hereinafter 
‘the Directive’). The central tenet of this contribution is that, as current and imminent 
experiences with the Directive will make clear, traditional implementation strategies of 
the Member States bear little fruit, in turn necessitating a radical U-turn in the caselaw 
of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) regarding the effect of EU law in the domestic 
legal order.8 All this becomes increasingly acute if the Lisbon Strategy is given a new 
4 On 24 Mar. 2009, Felipe González, chairman of the new Refl ection Group on the Future of Europe, decided 
to call a spade a spade and went public with the statement that the Lisbon Strategy had effectively failed. The European 
Commission has however repeatedly stated that exact progress on the Strategy is hard to measure, and has persistently 
refused to take a ‘Eurovision song contest’ approach and rank the twenty-seven Member States (see <www.ec.europa.eu/
growthandjobs/faqs/developments/index_en.htm>, last visited on 20 Apr. 2009). The grim statistics on the lack of progress 
so far may nonetheless be gleaned from the 2009 European Growth and Jobs Monitor: Indicators of Success in the Knowledge 
Economy, an annual competitiveness survey published by the ‘Lisbon Council’ think-tank, available at: <www.lisboncouncil.
net> (last visited on 20 Apr. 2009).
5 According to this principle, service providers wherever active in the EU would only have to comply with the rules 
and laws in force in their Member State of origin. It was included as Art. 16 in the draft Proposal of the Commission of 25 Feb. 
2004 for a Directive on services in the Internal Market, COM (2004) 2 fi nal.
6 The mass resistance, widely reported by the media, probably met its famous high water mark in May 2005, when 
local members of the electricians’ trade union in France responded to Commissioner Bolkestein’s Directive proposal by 
demonstrating and cutting off the electricity to his French holiday cottage. Although trade unions and NGOs were perhaps 
most vociferous in their opposition, intensely hostile views also existed within the two biggest parliamentary groups in the 
European Parliament (the centre-right EPP-ED group and the social-democrat PES faction) as well as several EU Member 
States (among which Greece and Italy).
7 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 Dec. 2006 on services in the internal market, 
Offi cial Journal 2006 L 376/36; Art. 44 states that ‘Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administra-
tive provisions necessary to comply with this Directive before 28 Dec. 2009.’
8 For an overview of recent developments in ECJ caselaw concerning the scope of the prohibition contained in Art. 
49 EC, see Jochen Meulman & Henri de Waele, ‘A Retreat from Säger? Servicing or Fine-Tuning the Application of Article 
49 EC’, Legal Issues of Economic Integration 33 (2006): 207–228.
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lease of life from 2010 onwards, and if a further stimulation and deregulation in the fi eld 
of services is pursued in the near future.9
2. A Brief Scan of the Directive
Contrary to a domain like EC competition law where numerous sectoral pieces of 
 legislation continue to exist alongside one another, in the fi eld of services, a bold and 
deliberate choice has been made in 2004 for launching a comprehensive legislative frame-
work. In fact, the scope of application of the Services Directive has never been restricted 
to the fi eld of services sensu stricto, and also covers situations wherein service providers 
avail themselves of their rights of free establishment. The current Directive consists of 
eight chapters and counts forty-six articles in total. Overall, its content may be divided 
into three parts, the fi rst part providing a further elaboration on its exact ambit. Here, in 
accordance with Article 50 of the EC Treaty, a service is defi ned as ‘any self-employed 
economic activity, normally provided for remuneration’.10 Due to this generic defi nition, 
the scope of application is truly astonishingly broad, covering such diverse manifestations 
as tourism, legal assistance, management consultancy, and prostitution.11 The second part 
of the Directive pertains to the establishment of service providers and service recipi-
ents, and the third part to services sec and the uninhibited provision thereof. These two 
parts make up the core of the Directive and have already been studied in great detail 
 elsewhere.12 In the following paragraphs, our inquiry will be limited to two articles only, 
included in the aforementioned second and third part, as these exemplify the transposi-
tion diffi culties facing the Member States and the Union – which, in turn, are thought 
to lead to enforcement diffi culties as well. Nonetheless, the observations made on these 
specifi c provisions are also of relevance to other domains of EU law, and may equally 
apply to other secondary legislation, since the Directive under review here is a typical 
product of the currently employed harmonization techniques in the EU.13
 9 As recommended in the latest edition of the WTO’s periodic Trade Policy Review. According to the Secretariat 
Report of 2 Mar. 2009 on the trade policies and practices of the European Communities (available at: <www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp314_e.htm>, last visited on 20 Apr. 2009), a robust economic recovery and sustained growth 
hinges on structural regulatory reforms and a further liberalization of services, both at the intra-EC level and vis-à-vis 
third countries.
10 Article 4 of the Directive.
11 Nonetheless, certain specifi c services have been excluded from its reach, partly because other rules are already in 
existence (e.g., for fi nancial and audiovisual services), partly because they were considered too controversial for inclusion 
(e.g., healthcare and specifi c services relating to social housing and childcare).
12 See e.g., S.J.H. Evans, ‘The Services Directive: Great Expectations? An Initial Overview of the Rights and Obliga-
tions of the Services Directive’, in EU and WTO Law on Services: Limits to the Realization of General Interest Policies within 
the Services Markets, ed. Johan van de Gronden (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2008), 41–72; Catharine Barnard, 
‘Unravelling the Services Directive’, Common Market Law Review 45 (2008): 323–394; Stefan Griller, ‘General Report’, in 
Die neue Dienstleistungsrichtlinie der Europäischen Union – The New Services Directive of the European Union – La nouvelle directive 
de l’Union européenne relative aux services, ed. H.S. Koeck & Margit Karollus, FIDE XXIII Congress, Linz 2008 (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2008), 379–421.
13 Compare, e.g., the recent Proposal for a Directive on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare, COM 
(2008) 414 fi nal, and also Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 Nov. 2007 on payment 
services in the internal market, Offi cial Journal 2007 L 319/1. For an excellent short overview and further discussion of the 
various approaches and methodologies of harmonization, see Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), Ch. 17, 604–636.
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3. Implementing the Services Directive: Two Key Provisions
For the purposes of the present inquiry, the fi rst provision to be analysed is Article 9 of 
the Directive, which stipulates that:
Member States shall not make access to a service activity or the exercise  –
thereof subject to an authorization scheme unless the following conditions 
are satisfi ed:
(a) the authorization scheme does not discriminate against the provider in 
question;
(b) the need for an authorization scheme is justifi ed by an overriding 
 reason relating to the public interest; and
(c) the objective pursued cannot be attained by means of a less restrictive 
measure, in particular because an a posteriori inspection would take 
place too late to be genuinely effective.
Thus, an authorization scheme for any service activity will henceforth only be possible 
if the scheme is justifi ed by an overriding reason of public interest, if the operation 
of the scheme is proportionate to its aims, and if it does not entail any form of direct 
 discrimination. The experienced EU lawyer cannot fail to notice that these requirements 
correspond one-on-one with the so-called ‘mandatory requirements doctrine’ or ‘rule of 
reason’ laid down by the ECJ in Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Brannt-
wein in relation to the free movement of goods, as more recently applied to services and 
establishment in the seminal Manfred Säger v. Dennemeyer & Co. and Reinhard Gebhard v. 
Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano judgments.14 Essentially then, this 
provision does little more than refl ect the law as it stands today; thus, it is devoid of novel 
normative content. By consequence, it is hard to understand how Member States should 
go about transposing this provision. Ordinarily, Directives are formally addressed to the 
EU Member States, but materially usually also entail obligations for natural and legal 
persons. This is however not the case as regards Article 9 of the Directive, which is both 
formally and materially addressed to the legislator. It is then rather understandable that 
several Member States have actually chosen not to implement said provision into rules 
of national law.15 At the same time though, this could be said to constitute a violation 
of their EC law obligations – for in doing so, they have knowingly disregarded the most 
hardcore prohibition regulating the classic, and nowadays the most important of the four 
freedoms. Of course, in defence, it may be pleaded that the added value of said provision 
is, as said, practically nil. Nonetheless, several other articles of the Directive (e.g., Article 
10 paragraph 4 and Article 13 paragraph 4) build upon Article 9, and further specify the 
14 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649; Case C-76/90,  Manfred 
Säger v. Dennemeyer & Co. [1991] ECR 1-4221 (hereinafter ‘Säger’); Case C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine 
degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] ECR I-4165.
15 Among which Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and the United Kingdom; see the respective national reports in 
Koeck & Karollus, supra n. 12.
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requirements on authorization schemes in order for these to be in  compliance with EU 
standards. Now in fact, Member State authorities have in the past years embarked upon a 
‘grand tour of refl ection’, verifying at every level of public administration whether their 
national rules and schemes on service provision are ‘Europa-proof ’ in light of the Direc-
tive. Despite this verifi cation exercise, one could still insist that their Treaty obligations 
have not been met. Though their choice was admittedly one between a rock and a hard 
place, full implementation of Article 9 did not truly take place: after all, this generally 
requires the adoption of binding rules of national law, either through primary (a general 
law or offi cial act of parliament), or by means of secondary (delegated) legislation.16
The second article to be considered here is Article 16 of the Directive, which 
 provides:
Member States shall respect the right of providers to provide services in a Member State other 
than that in which they are established.
The Member State in which the service is provided shall ensure free access to and free exer-
cise of a service activity within its territory.
To this it is added (inter alia) that Member States may not make access to, or exercise 
of a service activity in their territory subject to any rules that are directly or indirectly 
discriminatory, unnecessary, as well as disproportional to the objective pursued. Again, 
even the casual connoisseur of EC law will recognize the intrinsically codifying nature of 
the provision concerned: in accordance with vested caselaw of the ECJ regarding Article 
49 EC, any restrictions on service provisions are prohibited save for possible justifi cation 
because of mandatory requirements, that is, application of the rule of reason-doctrine.17 
Again, this left Member States little or no room for implementation – verbatim transpo-
sition being hard to imagine, moreover, appearing legally superfl uous anyhow. Nonethe-
less, in the same vein as before, one is inclined to conclude that, so long as in a Member 
State no corresponding binding rules of national law are adopted, Article 16 cannot be 
said to have been fully and properly transposed.
4. Enforcing the Services Directive: The Real Challenge Ahead
As noted above, for the creation of the long-awaited internal market in services, the 
Directive is of the utmost importance, but its objectives are unlikely to be attained if 
is not implemented timely or correctly, and if subsequently, enforcement of its essential 
provisions cannot be ensured in full. Here then appears to lay the great challenge for 
the European and the national legal orders. Although a ‘non-transposition-strategy’ of 
Member States regarding Articles 9 and 16 is, as stated, far from unintelligible, formidable 
problems may arise shortly due to the vested caselaw of the EU Courts. The position 
of the ECJ with regard to the enforcement of provisions of Directives that have not 
16 Thus, J.H. Jans et al., Europeanisation of Public Law (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2007), 13–14, referring to 
the two leading cases Case 97/81, Commission v. Netherlands [1982] ECR 1819 and Case C-361/88, Commission v. Germany 
[1981] ECR I-2567.
17 Or ‘imperative reasons relating to the public interest’; see the Säger case, cited supra n. 14, para. 15.
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been implemented into national law is quite clear: these cannot be effectuated before 
national courts in disputes between private parties.18 Though the picture is not entirely 
consistent and certain cracks have emerged over the past years, in EC law, it still remains 
a core principle that obligations fl owing solely and directly from a Directive may not be 
imposed by an individual upon another individual.19 This then would entail that, in any 
disputes between service providers and/or recipients falling within the (vast) ambit of 
the Directive, it is impossible to claim that a national rule of law contravenes its Article 
9 or 16. Thus, if for example, a domestic undertaking were to sue a service provider 
from a Member State for operating without the permit required by national law, the 
latter would be unable to contend that the permit requirement violates Article 9: provi-
sions from an unimplemented Directive cannot be effectuated between private parties. 
In fact, though one could say that the existence of the permit requirement proves that 
the Directive was not (or incorrectly) implemented, it is actually quite diffi cult to be 
certain about this: as it cannot be effectuated itself, a judge does not get to decide the 
case on its merits and test whether the permit requirement should indeed have been 
abolished or not.20 Similar hardships would be experienced if, for example, an undertak-
ing were to litigate against a rival non-domestic service provider for non-compliance 
with applicable national standards on the service concerned, as the latter fi rm could not 
defend itself by invoking Article 16. Naturally, the occurrence and persistence of such 
situations undermines the overriding goal of (further) services liberalization in Europe, 
and, rather than eliminating still existing obstacles, easily provokes new segmentations in 
the internal market.21
To overcome these troubles, the present author contends that idées reçues ought to 
be reconsidered and established concepts revised. Alternatively, however, one might prefer 
to follow trusted routes and paths. A viable strategy could appear to be continuation of 
the CIA Security International SA v. Signalson SA and Securitel SPRL (hereinafter ‘CIA 
Security’) and Unilever Italia SpA v. Central Food SpA (hereinafter ‘Unilever’) trail.22 In these 
two cases, private parties were allowed to rely on a Directive’s provisions vis-à-vis one 
another; according to the ECJ, these provisions did not defi ne the substantive scope of 
18 Case 152/84, M. Helen Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hampshire Health Authority [1986] ECR 723; Case 
C-91/92, Paola Faccini Dori v. Recreb SrL [1994] ECR I-3325 (hereinafter ‘Dori’).
19 Neither may public authorities do so (prohibition of ‘inverse direct effect’): see Case 80/86, Criminal Proceedings 
against Kolpinghuis Nijmegen [1987] ECR 3969. From such ‘obligations imposed upon individuals’, one should however 
distinguish ‘mere adverse repercussions on the rights of third parties [which], even if the repercussions are certain, do not 
justify preventing an individual from invoking the provisions of a directive against the Member State concerned’: see Case 
C-201/02, The Queen on the application of Delena Wells v. Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions [2004] 
ECR I-723, para. 56.
20 Leaving the issue unresolved save for eventual Commission infringement proceedings on the basis of 
Art. 226 EC.
21 The so-called Von Colson-duty of harmonious or Directive-conform interpretation, despite having been reaf-
fi rmed not long ago as a particularly strong one (see Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01, Bernard Pfeiffer and others v. 
Deutsches Rotes Kreuz [2004] ECR I-8835), would not be able to resolve the issue, as it can never produce a contra legem 
result, i.e., take offending national provisions integrally ‘out of business’; see Case C-334/92, Wagner Miret v. Fondo de 
Garantía Salarial [1993] ECR I-6911, and Case C-105/03, Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285.
22 Case C-194/94, CIA Security International SA v. Signalson SA and Securitel SPRL [1996] ECR I-2201; Case 
C-443/98, Unilever Italia SpA v. Central Food SpA [2000] ECR I-7535.
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the legal rule on the basis of which the national court had to decide the case before it, 
creating neither rights nor obligations. Now, it has been assumed in legal doctrine that 
these were exceptional cases, triggered by the supposed special features of the so-called 
Notifi cation Directive.23 Successful attainment of the goals of the Services Directive 
could however be achieved by applying an identical line of reasoning: after all, Articles 9 
and 16 as such do not contain any substantive rules for citizens and undertakings either, 
but rather call upon the legislator. In similar vein to the provisions of the Notifi cation 
Directive, they create neither rights nor obligations. In fact then, future caselaw on the 
Services Directive may offer an excellent opportunity for the Court to revitalize the CIA 
Security/Unilever approach and clarify its underlying mechanics more fully. No revolu-
tionary roads would thus have to be followed.
A second viable strategy might appear to be, to link in with the enigmatic Wer-
ner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm (hereinafter ‘Mangold’) case24 and expand upon its hitherto 
rather obscure foundations. In this case, even before the implementation period of the 
Directive concerned had expired, the national judge was instructed to apply its sub-
stantive provisions in conjunction with a general principle of EC law in a horizontal 
dispute between an employer and an employee.25 This enabled a material review of the 
relevant (German) national rule, which was thought to violate European rules on age 
discrimination, leading some commentators the question the overall consistency of ECJ 
caselaw on direct effect.26 However, in cases falling within the ambit of the Services 
Directive, where Articles 9 and 16 are certain to regulate and possibly solve the dispute 
at hand, one could well employ the Mangold line and allow for a combined reliance on 
the Directive’s provisions and the fundamental freedoms from the European Treaties. It 
would not at all be hard to regard the latter as general principles of Community law for 
this purpose. Again, the ECJ may fi nd an excellent opportunity here to demystify the 
underpinnings of earlier caselaw, counter its critics, and elaborate upon the cautious new 
direction of late.27
Whatever route is taken, the classic M. Helen Marshall v. Southampton and 
 South-West Hampshire Health Authority (hereinafter ‘Marshall’)/Paola Faccini Dori v. Rec-
reb SrL  (hereinafter ‘Dori’) stance on the complete absence of horizontal effects for 
23 Council Directive 83/189/EEC of 28 Mar. 1983 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the fi eld of 
technical standards and regulations, Offi cial Journal 1983 L 109/8, as amended by Directive 94/10/EC of the European Parliament 
and the Council of 23 Mar. 1994, Offi cial Journal 1994 L 100/30.
24 Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECR I-9981.
25 It concerned Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 Nov. 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation, Offi cial Journal 2000 L 303/16.
26 See ‘Editorial comments: Horizontal Direct Effect – A Law of Diminishing Coherence?’, Common Market Law 
Review 43 (2006): 1–8; Dagmar Schieck, ‘The ECJ Decision in Mangold: A Further Twist on Effects of Directives and Con-
stitutional Relevance of Community Equality Legislation’, Industrial Law Journal 35 (2006): 329–341. For a more nuanced 
view, see Jan H. Jans, ‘The Effect in National Legal Systems of the Prohibition of Discrimination on Grounds of Age as 
a General Principle of Community Law’, Legal Issues of Economic Integration 34 (2007): 53–66; Christa Tobler, ‘Putting 
 Mangold in Perspective: In Response to Editorial Comments’, Common Market Law Review 44 (2007): 1177–1183.
27 It should be added though that the ECJ recently and ostentatiously avoided elaborating upon the tentative 
 Mangold doctrine, despite critical input from A-G Mazák, in Case C-411/05, Félix Palacios de la Villa v. Cortefi eld Servicios 
SA [2007] ECR I-8531. As remarked by Waddington, Case Note, Common Market Law Review 45 (2008): 904–905, when 
reading this judgment, ‘one could easily be forgiven for assuming Mangold was simply a fi gment of the imagination’.
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 unimplemented provisions of Directives cannot be upheld in any case. For ruling out 
any applicability of the provisions of the Directive under review in horizontal disputes 
would mean reversing much of the progress already made in establishing an internal mar-
ket for services – progress which was largely achieved through bold ECJ jurisprudence, 
expansive interpretations of the relevant rules in the EC Treaty.28 From both a legal-
theoretical and a practical lawyer’s point of view, the quintessential horizontal character 
of the Directive renders sticking to a prohibition of such an effect in proceedings before 
national courts wholly inconceivable.
Though both of the abovementioned alternative approaches have their appeal, their 
drawbacks cannot go unmentioned. Building on the CIA Security and Mangold construc-
tions, respectively, unavoidably rekindles the debate on their merits, and many of the 
earlier criticisms are bound to be rehearsed and repeated. Indeed, both routes provide 
tailor-made solutions for the problems arising at the enforcement of the Service Direc-
tive, but rather than bringing method into madness, they risk reinforcing the already 
rather byzantine character of the caselaw regarding the horizontal effect of Directives. 
If the choice is made to pursue and revitalize the CIA Security and/or Mangold route, 
as said, bringing clarity still has to be one of the central aims. Nonetheless, it is advo-
cated here that a maximum of transparency would only be obtained if the ECJ were 
to reconsider its earlier Marshall and Dori position altogether, the general ban on hori-
zontal effect, which can be seen as lying at the true heart of the problem. In fact, the 
Marshall/Dori stance itself has been under the heftiest fi re overall. It has over the years 
been repeatedly and strenuously attacked by legal scholars throughout the EU, even by 
multiple Advocates-General at the Luxembourg Court itself.29 CIA Security and Mangold 
have in this light been reported as possible early harbingers of a new age, but sadly have 
so far proven to be false dawns, exacerbating rather than diminishing the confusion.30 
Arguably, the advent of the Services Directive serves as a fi nal wake-up call, and if future 
disputes relating to the enforcement of its provisions are to be solved satisfactorily, the 
28 The latter being so expansively interpreted as to regulate certain horizontal situations as well; albeit, so far, only 
those situations in which an individual can be said to wield a ‘certain power’ over another individual, and to be able to 
signifi cantly hamper the full exercise of the Treaty freedoms in the same vein as a public law authority: see, e.g., Joined 
Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97, Christelle Deliège v. Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées ASBL [2000] ECR I-2549 
(concerning sporting associations); Case C-309/99, J.C.J. Wouters, J.W. Savelbergh and Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV v. 
Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten [2002] ECR I-1577 (concerning the national bar association); Case 
C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti 
[2007] ECR I-10779 (concerning large and powerful trade unions). Consequently, in the views of most commentators, the 
Treaty rules on services so far only exert an ‘extended vertical effect’.
29 For the various arguments and further references, see F. Emmert & M. Perreira de Azevedo, ‘L’effet horizontal des 
directives. La jurisprudence de la CJCE: un bateau ivre?’, Revue trimestrielle de droit européen (1993): 503; F. Capelli, ‘L’effi cacia 
orizzontale delle direttive secondo una giurisprudenza incompiuta’, Diritto comunitario e degli scambi internazionali (1994): 
51; Paul Craig, ‘Directives: Direct Effect, Indirect Effect and the Construction of National Legislation’, European Law 
Review (1997): 519; Michael Dougan, ‘The Disguised Vertical Direct Effect of Directives?’, Cambridge Law Journal (2000): 
586; Lorna Young, Miriam Lenz, & Dóra Sif Tynes, ‘Horizontal What? Back to Basics’, European Law Review (2000): 509; 
Takis Tridimas, ‘Black, White and Shades of Grey: Horizontality of Directives Revisited’, Yearbook of European Law (2002): 
327; Sacha Prechal, Directives in EC Law, 2nd completely revised edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 255); Opinion 
of A-G Van Gerven in Case C-316/93, Nicole Vaneetveld v. Le Foyer SA [1994] ECR I-763; Opinion of A-G Lenz in Dori 
[1994] ECR I-3325.
30 Thus, in the wake of these cases, the once promising solution of distinguishing between so-called invocabilité de sub-
stitution and invocabilité d’exclusion seems to have failed even before its proper take-off; compare Prechal, supra n. 29, 262.
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time is ripe to do away with the misguided prohibition once and for all. Completing 
the internal market demands as much, which is and always has been the overriding aim 
of the pères fondateurs.
5. Conclusion: Shifting the Boundaries
As this contribution has very succinctly sought to point out, the Services Directive 
presents a great challenge to the European and the national legal orders. Its successful 
adoption at the EU level did not yet guarantee the desired fi nal liberalization of the 
European services market. In order to achieve that objective, the Directive has to deploy 
its full effect, and for that, by the end of this year, the implementation phase fi rst has to 
be completed successfully. Second, in the years ahead, no fetters whatsoever should be 
placed on its enforcement, for which the present paper recommends the abandonment 
of the Marshall/Dori line: it is in fact little short of an absolute necessity, and also a move 
highly anticipated for quite some time already.
National authorities in the EU Member States are experiencing plenty of diffi cul-
ties in (having to adapt to) the various substantive norms included the Services Directive. 
As outlined above, the transposition of the latter’s key provisions is, moreover, less easy 
than it seems, however large the expertise built up in the past, and despite the many best 
practises that have come to fruition so far. A new generation of Directives is looming 
ahead, forcing national authorities to deal with complicated questions of EU institutional 
law as well, enforcement issues taking pride of place. Perhaps one could say that, already 
at the inception of the Directive, a grievous error was committed, and that the Services 
Directive’s construction is fl awed of itself. For codifi cations of caselaw form its key pro-
visions, and the transposition and enforcement complications described above both arise 
out of this particular drafting method. The boundaries between ‘negative’ and ‘positive 
integration’ have been blurred, by provocatively replicating broad prohibitions from EC 
primary law (the Treaty) in (effects-wise) more sharply confi ned harmonizing norms of 
EC secondary law (a Directive). In so doing, the European legislator has inadvertently 
forced Member States and their competent authorities, national courts, and even the ECJ, 
to reconsider their ways of old.
It might seem odd and somewhat far-fetched to call for a caselaw U-turn for the 
sole benefi t of the Services Directive. Yet as said, this Directive constitutes only the fi rst 
of a new breed, a lab model of inserting ‘negative integration’ clauses into secondary 
law. Moreover, the aim of the Directive and the growing importance of rules on services 
necessitates of itself that the challenge be faced rather than dodged. In the great game 
of drafting EC legislation, boundaries have been redrawn, and the umpire not keeping 
up does so at his own peril. A long-awaited change to the latter’s rule-book may be all 
it takes to tackle the challenge ahead.
